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Personalizing solidarity? The
role of self-tracking in health
insurance pricing
Liz McFall
Abstract
Can data-driven innovations, working across an internet of connected things, person-
alize health insurance prices? The emergence of self-tracking technologies and their
adoption and promotion in health insurance products has been characterized as a
threat to solidaristic models of healthcare provision. If individual behaviour rather
than group membership were to become the basis of risk assessment, the social, econ-
omic and political consequences would be far-reaching. It would disrupt the distribu-
tive, solidaristic character that is expressed within all health insurance schemes, even in
those nominally designated as private or commercial. Personalized risk pricing is at odds
with the infrastructures that presently define, regulate and deliver health insurance.
Self-tracking can be readily imagined as an element in an ongoing bio-political redistri-
bution of the burden of responsibility from the state to citizens but it is not clear that
such a scenario could be delivered within existing individual private health insurance
operational and regulatory infrastructures. In what can be gleaned from publicly avail-
able sources discussing pricing experience in the individual markets established by the
Patient Protection andAffordableCareAct 2010 (ACA),widely known as ‘Obamacare’,
it appears unlikely that it can provide the means to personalize price. Using the case of
Oscar Health, a technology driven start-up trading in the ACAmarketplaces, I explore
the concepts, politics and infrastructures at work in health insurance markets.
Keywords: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2010 (ACA); Obamacare;
Oscar Health; solidarity; risk; self-tracking.
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Today the average American’s health insurance payments fluctuate once a year.
Imagine if that rate changed each day, determined in part by a sensor-rich gadget
on the wrist. (Olson, 2014)
Data mining and monitoring not only allow insurers to price policies more accu-
rately, but also enable them to modify customers’ behaviour. (The Economist,
2015)
Introduction
How attentive to the personal should price be? Personalized products and ser-
vices, the bespoke, tailored, monogrammed and unique are usually prized but
prices are different. Prices should be general, they are tied to the qualities
and quantities of a product consumed, but within certain tolerated variations
they should be, or at least appear to be, the same for all buyers. This principle
has a relatively short history and there have always been market spaces in which
price is too fluid, too complex or opaque to expose patterns in its variations.
Insurance is a case in point. Where the product priced is risk, and the
product sold is security, there are easy arguments that price must vary. In
private health insurance it is accepted that individual prices will vary according
to age, behaviour and health indicators in the interests of statistical or ‘actuarial’
fairness (Arrow, 1963; Baker, 2010; Leaver, 2015; Meyers & Van Hoyweghen,
2018). This idea of actuarial fairness helps make the politics, the distributional
stakes and consequences of insurance seem just technical. It is technical, but it is
simultaneously social and political. The dynamics of personalized, behavioural,
data-driven pricing expose this and subject insurance practices to renewed
public, political and regulatory scrutiny.
New ‘big’ data forms – data that can be intimate and super-massive, dynamic
and historical, scattered and integrated – present a global, grand challenge that is
widely apprehended but less well understood empirically. Research on how this
challenge is being handled in insurance is scant, notwithstanding the frequency
with which insurance is invoked as an exemplar of the privacy, surveillance and
societal concerns raised by big data. There are extant applications of behavioural
tracking data, for example in car insurance, being used for risk assessment
(McFall & Moor, 2018; Meyers, 2018) but the industry remains some way
from the scenarios presented in the epigraphs. There are many sector and
location specific reasons for this. In this paper I explain how the conceptual,
regulatory and infrastructural practices of insurance act as barriers to risk
personalization.
Insurance, whether nominally private or public, has a collective, social char-
acter. It can be thought of as a practical, organizational form of solidarity that
allows payment responsibility for the risks of illness, injury, death, accident,
crime, etc. to be shared. While prices or contributions charged to individuals
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vary, they vary by group, not individual, characteristics. As Swedloff puts it
‘insurers set prices by predicting the probability that any group of observation-
ally identical individuals will suffer a loss… [they] individuate those prices by
determining whether the particular observable characteristics of a particular
insured correlate with particular harms’ (2015, p. 342). Big data working
across an internet of connected things suggests the possibility of something
different – a means of pricing based, not on observed, group characteristics,
but on apps and devices tracking individual behaviour. This possibility is at
odds with the infrastructures, that is, the conceptual and classificatory logics,
the regulatory environment and the working practices that ‘sort out’ health
insurance (Bowker & Star, 1999).
I concentrate specifically on the politically volatile individual insurance
markets established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2010
(ACA), popularly known as ‘Obamacare’, in the United States. In these
market situations it is unlikely that self-tracking data can provide a meaningful
proxy for individual risk. Insurers have an interest in self-tracking data and
technologies that is connected to pricing but there is a proviso. Insurance
pricing is not an exact science. Rather it is a delicate algebra connecting actuarial
(mathematical) and non-actuarial (accounting) – factors. Price has to entice indi-
viduals away from bearing their own risks, comply with elaborate regulatory fra-
meworks, balance premium income with investment income and reconcile a
host of other costs and contingencies. This challenge has shaped the industry’s
historically bearish attitude to reputation and branding in an attempt to stave off
fluctuating consumer appeal and unwanted regulatory attention (McFall, 2011,
2014).
Still, close attention should be paid to how the industry deals with new tech-
nologies. ‘Big data’ technologies, correlative analyses and mythologies (boyd &
Crawford, 2012) are industry ‘disruptors’. Who gets access to what data, what
sorts of analyses are being conducted, to what ends? Already a handful of
giant corporations with the means to analyze big data are benefitting while indi-
viduals, groups and governments, struggle to understand and regulate the con-
sequences. Self-tracking data amplifies these concerns (Lupton, 2016a, 2016b;
Neff & Nafus, 2016; O’Neil, 2016; Schüll, 2016) since, if insurance providers
use it to personalize price they simultaneously personalize access to care.
Given the numerous governmental efforts to embrace the emerging paradigms
of digital, personalized healthcare as solutions to the global, triple challenge of
managing costs, quality and access, it is important to scrutinize what payers
want with self-tracking data. In what follows, I explore these issues beginning
with a discussion of the conceptual foundations of solidarity as a solution to
the social problem of insuring healthcare. I then use a documentary analysis
of ACA policy and provisions to describe how the individual markets were
set-up and how they incentivize personalization. I close with the case of
Oscar Health, a company trading in the ACA marketplaces that has been
closely associated with risk personalization.
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Concepts and organized practices of solidarity
It is the technical system’s coordinated ability to react, circumscribe a range of
possible responses, to be the cause of its own outcomes that supports life - not
the data. (Poon, 2016, p. 1090)
Martha Poon’s precise sentence goes straight to the infrastructural point. Data,
no matter how super-massive, does nothing unless and until it is embedded in
an infrastructure that can react to it in a coordinated way to achieve its own out-
comes, its own solutions to identified problems. This is the core of the question
of whether big data can personalize solidarity. The concept of solidarity can be
traced back to the Roman law of obligations wherein it was defined as the unlim-
ited liability of each individual member within a family or community to honour
common debts (Bayertz, 1999; Prainsack & Buyx, 2017). By the early nineteenth
century, solidarity functioned more as a political ideal, an ideal that became
closely associated with the infrastructures and techniques of social or welfare
provision, notably through insurance mechanisms. As the temper of post-war
European social policy began to shift away from this ideal in the 1980s, a
group of Foucauldian theorists re-examined this history, locating solidarity
and the insurance mechanism within broader governmental rationalities or ‘gov-
ernmentalities’ (Burchell et al., 1991).
In Jacques Donzelot (1988, 1991) recounting, welfare states emerged as the
solution to the problem of how to define the role of the state after the 1848
European revolutions. The problem centred on the conflict between those
who expected states to intervene to protect workers’ rights and those who
expected minimal intervention. Solving this involved two operations that
would constitute the welfare state. The first established a distinction
between sovereignty and solidarity. The second saw the language of statistics
transcend the language of rights, a process also carefully observed in the intel-
lectual histories supplied by Ian Hacking (1990) and Theodore Porter (1996),
among others. These moves helped transform solidarity from an abstract ideal
to something that could be accomplished as a practice using the intellectual
techniques and infrastructures of insurance. Solidarity, inter alia, becomes a
means of defining the context, limits and justification of state intervention
and the conceptual grounds for social legislation designed to absorb the
greater risks faced by certain members of society. Insurance then is the ‘tech-
nique’ – a term I use to signal both the technologies and working practices
involved – that realises this vision of solidarity. It also provides the first prac-
tical test of statistical knowledge as a tool for organizing the social (McFall,
2011; Poovey, 2002; Porter, 1996). In Ewald’s (1991) analysis, insurance
allows the task of determining cause, blame or fault to be set aside. Instead
the burden can be distributed across a community of members whose contri-
butions can be fixed in explicit rules. The social problem can thereby be
addressed by organizing interdependence rather than establishing responsibil-
ity for individual failings, faults and duties.
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This vision of insurance as a welfare state technique is not, of course, the form
US health insurance takes. Insurance has a formal generality that allows it to be
versioned to suit many purposes. In O’Malley’s (1996) reckoning, this capacity
to vary with governmental rationalities has assumed two main forms - socialized
actuarialism, more or less conforming to welfare state ideals, and privatized
actuarialism, more or less resembling the US model. In practice, political expe-
diencies, contingencies and compromises mean that the working infrastructures
of insurance combine socialized and privatized elements in most governmental
contexts. These elements have become harder to disentangle amidst the welfare
state reforms – designated loosely by terms such as marketization, privatization
or neoliberalization – of the last 40 years. Material and substantial changes to the
distribution of responsibility and risk continue. The interesting question is
whether this also eradicates the solidaristic character of insurance.
Solidarity has come to connote redistributive forms of welfare policy
(Baldwin, 1990; Lehtonen & Liukko, 2012; Prainsack & Buyx, 2017) that are
clearly not expressed in all forms of insurance. Yet insurance, as defined by
the infrastructures and practices through which it is enacted, always involves
a solidaristic sharing or ‘pooling’ of risk. This is true even of US health insur-
ance, a political context in which redistributive reforms are mobilized repeatedly
as assaults on individual freedom. Attempts to establish universal coverage were
politically fractious and bitterly fought, sometimes on surprising lines, through-
out the twentieth century (Dobbin, 1992; Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010; Murray,
2007). In the last quarter of the century, tensions heightened in both the
Reagan and the Clinton administrations. When President Obama took office
in 2008 pledging to reform healthcare, partisan polarization took off. Reform
became a polemical dogwhistle and a battle to be waged in a counterfactual
context. The complexity of the system facilitates a disavowal of the public
‘socializing’ transfers that underpin it. It is a system dominated by private
employer-led, large group insurance but there is a vast range of state subsidies
and incentives to employers as well as state funded and administered systems
catering for the aged, veterans, children and the very poor.
Solidaristic elements persist even within a predominantly privatized insur-
ance system. Insurance is solidaristic because it transforms entities into
grouped, risk-bearing categories (McFall &Moor, 2018; Meyers & Van Hoywe-
ghen, 2018). Risk has to be grouped because it cannot be calculated at an indi-
vidual level. Instead individual risk profiles are derived from membership of
defined groups. Invoking Frank Knight’s (1921) classic distinction between
risk, which is a calculable property, and uncertainty, which is not, Ewald
explains that risk ‘only becomes something calculable when it is spread over a
population. The work of the insurer is, precisely, to constitute that population
by selecting and dividing risks’ (1991, p. 203).
This selection and division of risk groups configures rather than dismantles
solidarity. A purely distributive, or purely solidaristic, form of insurance in
which nothing is known about individuals and no individual risk assessments
are carried out, Abraham (1985) noted, may be possible in theory but it is not
Liz McFall: Personalizing solidarity? 5
seen in practice. Instead, assessment drives contemporary insurance practice
and this ‘necessarily limits the amount of risk distribution achieved by an insur-
ance arrangement, because it uses knowledge about risk expectancies to set
different prices for members of different groups’ (Abraham, 1985, p. 405).
This classification of individuals into pools, in theory, could mean pools get
smaller and smaller. Ericson, Barry and Doyle (2000) made a strong case that
this unpooling was precisely what the private insurance industry was doing
by the end of the twentieth century. But whether the industry could ever func-
tion as insurance, and not some other kind of finance, conceptually, infrastruc-
turally or practically, with truly individual or personal risk classification is a
confounding puzzle. Abraham wrote that no risk classification system ‘can clas-
sify and price individual risks with anything near complete accuracy; the future
is too uncertain for that’ (p. 405) but that was in 1985, long before the persona-
lizing tendency in everyday data encounters had begun to manifest.
Currently, individual risk assessment is practiced alongside distribution in
private insurance. This is true whether the insurance pool is run for the
private benefit of its members, proprietors and investors, for public, societal
benefit or, more likely, some combination. US health insurers, known as
‘payers’, may be publicly or privately owned or one of several variants including
mutuals and co-ops. These ownership arrangements however are not the only
thing that complicates the definition of a privatized actuarial system. There
are also the state funding transfers to be accounted for. Almost counterintui-
tively, the US government pays considerably more per head toward healthcare
than the UK government, despite its single payer, free at the point of use,
National Health Service. The Commonwealth Fund’s 2015 calculations
placed public spending on healthcare in the United States the third highest at
$4,197 per capita.1 The US system also ranks as one of the world’s most expens-
ive ways of delivering indifferent health outcomes.
The idea of solidarity sets in motion the practical task of organizing the dis-
tribution of risk, but it does not supply the recipe. Rules surrounding member-
ship, contribution, entitlement and reimbursement have to be made to fit
distinctive political and cultural logics. Different national systems and the
forms of public, redistributive transfer that underpin them, are shaped by a
mess of political and historical contingencies. In the next section, I discuss
how the Affordable Care Act promotes behavioural personalization while sim-
ultaneously placing regulatory barriers in the way of pricing personalization.
The Affordable Care Act as redistributive regulation
The United States has a byzantine healthcare system structured in four main
parts (See Figure 1). Healthcare provision is generally, though not always, sep-
arated from payment. For the majority of Americans payment is made through
private, employment-related insurance. This means that US healthcare is often
categorized as a privatized insurance system. While this is true, it is also
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misleading. The label obfuscates the government’s funding role in two of the
largest branches of US healthcare: Medicare and Medicaid. Medicare, the
program for the over 65s; and Medicaid, the program for those on very low
income or living with disability, are publicly funded and accounted for
around 40 per cent of coverage in 2016.
That these government programmes occupy such a large share of a nominally
private system is peculiarly in keeping with the politically fragile and fractious
history of US healthcare. This history has been debated extensively (Dobbin,
1992; Jacobs & Skocpol, 2010; Murray, 2007) but the takeaway point is that
US healthcare is not so much a system that has refused funding by social trans-
fers as it is one that has produced extraordinarily complex means of operating
and identifying them. Since the 1930s, US healthcare reform has been piece-
meal and painful. The financing for the original 1935 Social Security blueprint
was subject to almost continuous disruption until the 1950s and beyond, and the
financing of Medicare enacted in the 1960s was not stabilized until the Reagan
administration (Skocpol, 2010). Healthcare policy reform became effectively a
proxy for the partisan idea of free individuals standing against an interventionist
state. Reform becomes ‘political theater, cleverly scripted to provoke media cov-
erage, rev up partisans, and convince uncertain or uninformed voters that some-
thing big and scary still remains at issue’ (Skocpol, 2010, p. 1289).
This atmosphere, combined with a poorly understood, highly complex and
variable system, promotes a situation in which voters are apt to mobilize
against their own interests. In the protests accompanying Obama’s reforms,
the phrase ‘keep the government out of my Medicaid’ began to appear on pla-
cards. This ‘useful ignorance’ (McGoey, 2012) was exploited by the Republican
Party (also known as the GOP, for Grand Old Party) opponents of the ACA. It
enabled them to position ‘Obamacare’ as a scheme a scheme that was partly
Figure 1 Percentage of people by type of health insurance coverage and change from
2013 to 2016
Source: US Census Bureau, 2017.
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modelled on a Republican scheme (Mick Romney’s ‘Romneycare’). Labelling
the ACA Obamacare transformed the legislation into a signal that the first
black President meant to have government interfere in people’s most intimate
rights to live – and die – as they chose. The most extreme manipulation of
the fears this provoked was a Koch brothers funded commercial featuring a
prone woman awaiting a clinical examination when approached by a specu-
lum-bearing Uncle Sam.2 In this atmosphere, the years of partisan deadlock,
and the federal shutdown that followed in 2014, were predictable. The vast gov-
ernmental machinery required to administrate healthcare is, like all infrastruc-
tures, silent until it breaks (Bowker & Star, 1999). This allowed the blame for
the well-known and well-documented problems with US healthcare to be vol-
leyed around in a precursor of Trump’s post-factual politics.
Thosewhodonot qualify forMedicare orMedicaid, and are not coveredby their
employers, can be accommodated by direct purchase in the ‘individual and small
groupmarket’. This is where the gaping hole in cover exists. The uninsured popu-
lation varied between almost 40 per cent prior to the ACA, lowering to around 29
per cent, after the ACA’s full provisions came into force.3 The uninsured rate has
begun to rise again with the Trump administration’s shambolic weakening of the
Act’s provisions.4 Even among those with cover, underinsurance is widespread
and medical expenses are the leading cause of personal bankruptcy. The failures
in the individual/small group market on which this paper focuses, presented the
major, though not the only challenge5, the ACA addressed. High proportions of
people opted out of this market because of pricing and access barriers. Those
with ‘pre-existing conditions’ were met with prohibitive prices even if they
could find an insurer willing to offer cover. The ACA addressed this in three
main ways. It imposed detailed requirements on insurers offering health plans, it
introduced the ‘individual mandate’ requiring the purchase of health plans and it
offered a range of public subsidies to make them more affordable.
As Tom Baker (2010) notes, this was part of a longer trend away from an
ordinary market approach towards a ‘fair share’ approach supported by taxation
and market regulation. ‘Fair share’, though, was far too close to an incursion on
individual freedom for Republican appetites and the ACA encountered a relent-
less barrage of legal challenges. Ironically, the same concerns about state incur-
sion and subsidy coming from within the GOP’s Freedom Caucus of ultra
conservatives and libertarians hobbled the Trump administration’s first
attempts to replace the ACA with the American Health Care Act. At the time
of writing, an albeit weakened ACA remains in force and has accomplished
some measure of redistribution. The administration’s many botched attempts
to fulfil the ‘replace and repeal’ campaign promise has foundered repeatedly
on – who knew? – the extraordinary complexity of interests and regulation
involved in delivering healthcare policy. Trump has settled on significantly
weakening the Act’s protections including repealing the individual mandate
and permitting the sale of inexpensive ‘skinny’ plans with limited protections.6
What remains in place contains important lessons about the paradox inherent in
personalizing solidarity.
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Tackling the malfunctioning individual market meant finding a means of cov-
ering the 41 million people estimated to be uninsured at the end of 2013.7 The
means selected were federal subsidies and the individual mandate that required
all eligible Americans to have basic health coverage or risk a penalty known as
the Shared Responsibility Payment (SRP). State marketplaces were set-up
through which providers could offer ‘Qualified Health Plans’ (QHPs) featuring
pre-defined essential health benefits, established limits on cost-sharing (that is,
the amount individuals pay for directly through deductibles, co-payments and
out-of-pocket expenses) and identical premiums irrespective of pre-existing
conditions.8 QHPs come in different categories – bronze, silver, gold, platinum
and catastrophic – and feature levels ranging from 60 to 90 per cent of cost-
sharing with providers. Subsidies are available for those with incomes
between 100 and 400 per cent of the Federal Poverty Line and, with limited
exceptions for age and smoking, insurers cannot charge more for pre-existing
conditions.
Prior to the ACA insurers could discriminate against those with pre-existing
conditions. They charged higher premiums and refused cover to individuals
whose health status meant they would require ongoing and expensive care.
Pre-existing conditions and ‘lifetime limits’ on care costs have since become
shorthand for the public debate surrounding the repeal efforts.9 In prohibiting
pricing and access discrimination the ACA sought to collectivize entrenched
individualistic ideas about fairness and responsibility. The link made between
fairness and healthcare consumption is in line with the actuarial fairness
approach outlined by Arrow (1963). Here fairness is the outcome of statistical
risk pricing. The ACA alternative introduced a ‘behavioural’ approach
(Meyers, 2018) including new responsibilities to pay a ‘fair share’ of the costs
of the entire pool and be ‘as healthy as you can’. The responsibility to be
healthy is promoted by the provision of access to preventative care and treat-
ments for chronic, preventable disease. Smoking is not defined as a pre-existing
condition and smokers face surcharges but they must also be offered free cessa-
tion therapy.10 This emphasis on behavioural responsibility is a great fit with
data-driven healthcare innovations including wearable self-tracking devices
and apps. These solutions are usually accessed outside traditional healthcare set-
tings and are much more likely to be consumer retail purchases than prescrip-
tions. That, as Neff and Nafus (2016) explain, places them outside of both the
regulations that govern medical devices and the legal protections that apply to
data gathered in healthcare settings.11
On the provider side, the ACA attempts to promote health and wellness by
introducing Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). ACOs feature a reimbur-
sement model based on the quality of outcomes rather than the quantity of ser-
vices. Fee-for-service remains the dominant payment model but in ACOs
reimbursement is tied to quality metrics and reductions in the total cost of
care via prevention. ACOs must ‘define processes to promote evidence-based
medicine and patient engagement, monitor and evaluate quality and cost
measures, meet patient-centeredness criteria and coordinate care across the
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care continuum’ (Gorrell, 2016, pp. 4–5). That reimbursement systems are
drawn into relentless gaming where payer and provider interests collide in
the classification, coding and reimbursement of care in a policy environment
that is constantly adjusting incentives, has been well documented (Bowker &
Star, 1999; Gerson & Star, 1991; Pasquale, 2013). For Neff and Nafus
(2015), overt gaming has been ramped up in the financialized environment
that health care reforms, including the ACA, operate within. The ‘medical
loss ratio’, often used to express the difference between medical and administra-
tive costs, has also been invoked as a signal to investors. A payer with a low
medical loss ratio may be read as one with a healthier, and less costly, pool.
The ACA directly addresses this issue by requiring large health plans to maintain
a medical loss ratio of 85% or higher. Plans with medical loss ratios below this
threshold will be required to pay a rebate to the employers or individuals who
purchased the plan. The purpose of the law is to ensure that health insurance
premiums go to paying for medical services and to limit the proportion spent
on profits and other administrative expenses. (Mulligan, 2015, p. 45)
As Mulligan explains, this produced an immediate burst of creativity as payers,
once bent on restricting what counted as reimbursable medical care, began
pushing for an enlarged definition. The resulting ‘payment policy arms race’
has payers and providers both using data coding specialists to either provide,
or avoid, a rationale for claims denial.
This adds up to an environment in which datafied individualization of health
responsibility appears like an inevitability. As Schüll notes, in the buzzing
digital health scene, new technologies and the ACA have been presented as a
‘dynamic duo’ working together and ‘compelling insurers, health care providers
and consumers to cut costs… shifting the management of chronic conditions
like diabetes and heart disease away from hospitals and doctors and into the
hands of patients themselves’ (2016, p. 318). Whatever benefits this technologi-
cal and legislative communion in fostering patient-centred care may offer, there
are intrinsic risks that data driven personalization could also mean targeting, dis-
crimination and exclusion of minority and ‘underserved’ groups. Insurance
companies thus might use the data ‘to manage our health through incentives,
punishments or rewards that exert tight control over our daily activities’
(Neff & Nafus, 2016, p. 135). Lupton (2016a) cautions
Insurance and credit companies are scraping big data sets to develop customer
profiles, with the result that disadvantaged groups suffer further disadvantage
by being targeted for differential offers or excluded altogether because they
are not viewed as profitable or as poor credit risks. Data brokers in the United
States use available personal data to calculate certain predictive ‘health scores’
on patients with the help of digital data; such scores include the ACA individual
health risk score, which is used for assessing the risk factor for an individual who
requires healthcare. (p.120, emphasis added)
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That insurers are using wearables and smartphones to financialize new ‘big
mother’ forms of nudging surveillance, is a widely circulated narrative. In Sep-
tember 2018, when the US insurance company John Hancock announced it
would stop underwriting traditional life insurance to sell only ‘interactive’ pol-
icies that track fitness and health data, the product release was announced by
Reuters and provoked a volley of free publicity. The New York Times, Forbes,
CNBC, the BBC and The Conversation were among many covering the story.
It even earned an unusually well-circulated response to an insurance story
from academic Twitter with Kate Crawford, founder of the AI Now Institute
at New York University, earning 1,807 retweets, 2,416 likes and 63 replies12
for a tweet remarking on the ‘endless trapdoors ahead: data inaccuracies, inten-
tional gaming, constant intimate surveillance 24/7’ (Crawford et al., 2015;
Lupton, 2016a).
The stakes are high after all. These devices, as Nafus puts it, ‘could yet
become the very worst modernity has to offer – social control masquerading
as science’ (2016, p. xii). Data ethicists remark on the disparity between
people’s expressed privacy concerns and their data practices (Moats &
McFall, 2018). Faced by long and detailed terms and conditions and a barely
comprehensible technical vocabulary it is not surprising that many ‘click and
accept’ rather than analyze what kind of uses their personal data might be put
to. Personal data gathered from apps, devices and websites has already been
monetized by stealth because it is so easy to bury permissions in plain sight
and so difficult to figure out what is, and what is not, a permissible use. The
Google Deepmind/ NHS Royal Free health data controversy, as excavated
by Powles and Hodson (2017), is a great example of this. It is also a sign of
the importance of the regulatory environment and the need for expertise,
effort and attention to the specificities of data practices. In the case of insurance
pricing, this means studying carefully how the tensions between risk assessment
and distribution are being addressed. The role of the Individual Risk Score in
the ACA’s model is a good place to start.
The individual risk score: a redistributive personalization
That insurers offering QHPs cannot deny coverage or charge premiums based on
health status might imply that risk distribution presides over assessment in the
ACA. Insurance however creates tendencies toward risk selection, adverse selec-
tion andmoral hazard that have, in practice, to bemanaged through some form of
risk assessment. How these tendencies are defined and managed has been exten-
sively debated (c.f. Ericson et al., 2000; Leaver, 2015). Risk selection, in general,
is observed where insurers market to low risks, for example by developing pro-
ducts with low premiums and high deductibles like the ‘skinny plans’ introduced
by the current administration. These are unlikely to appeal to those with expens-
ive health conditions. Risk selection can also be accomplished by marketing that
targets the affluent, educated and healthy indirectly. Adverse selection occurs
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because those who know themselves at greatest risk are considered more likely to
buy insurance. Moral hazard in health insurance comes into play where the
insured overconsume services or even become wilfully negligent of their health
with an insurance pay-out in prospect. In the absence of any risk assessment to
regulate such tendencies, pricing uncertainty can deter providers from offering
plans or result in volatile premium pricing. Adverse selection could lead to
‘death spirals’ in marketplaces disproportionately populated by those in need
of care, leading to higher premiums. To address these kinds of distortions the
ACA introduced three actuarial programmes – risk adjustment, reinsurance
and risk corridors – designed to counter adverse and risk selection and to stabilize
premiums. These are outlined in Table 1.
Risk adjustment addresses selection bias by calculating Individual Risk
Scores to determine the overall actuarial risk of plans. It transfers funds from
plans with lower risk profiles to those with higher risk profiles and is the
only provision that was designed to be permanent. Reinsurance is a temporary
programme to stabilize individual market premiums by reducing the incentives
for insurers to charge higher premiums due to uncertainty about the health
status of enrollees. It provides reinsurance payments when plan costs cross a
threshold called an ‘attachment point’, while if reinsurance contributions fall
short of the amount requested for payments, then that year’s reinsurance pay-
ments decrease proportionately. Risk corridors promote accurate premiums by
discouraging insurers from setting high premiums to hedge against uncertainty
about who they enrol and what they might cost. The corridors set a target of 80
per cent of premium dollars to be spent on health care and quality improvement,
insurers with costs 3 per cent less than the target were to pay into the pro-
gramme and the collected funds were to be used to reimburse plans with
costs more than 3 per cent. Payments, in the original statute, were not required
to net to zero, and any increase in costs or revenues was to be borne or absorbed
by the federal government. This provision was weakened by Congress in 2015
and 2016 amidst arguments against federal bailouts for the insurance industry.
In June 2018, two ACA insurers lost a case against the federal government
claiming they were entitled to payment under the risk corridor programme.
The marketplaces, as it turned out, have not been overly profitable. The indi-
vidual mandate was aggressively challenged. In the 2012 Supreme Court case the
mandate was compared to the government forcing Americans to buy broccoli.13
As a result, the Shared Responsibility Payment (SHP), the penalty for not com-
plying, was soft, ranging from only $95 in 2014 to $695 in 2016. The present US
government is due to abandon it in 2019.14 The SHP was cheaper than the cost of
even the cheapest plans and was not a sufficient incentive for the targeted ‘young
invincibles’. Those enrolling between 2014 and 2016 were disproportionately
older, sicker and costlier, and with the reduction in federal funding of the risk cor-
ridors, the state markets in 2016 saw rising premiums and the steady withdrawal
of plans and insurers, particularly by smaller players and co-ops.15
The case highlights the tensions between assessment and distribution, individ-
ual and collective responsibility, in insurance solidarity. Risk corridors,
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Table 1 Summary of Risk and Market Stabilization Program in the Affordable Care Act.
Risk Adjustment Reinsurance Risk Corridors
What
the programme does
Redistributes funds from plans with
lower-risk enrollees to plans with
higher-risk enrollees
Provides payment to plans that enroll
higher-cost individuals
Limits losses and gains beyond an
allowable range
Why
it was enacted
Protects against adverse selection and
risk selection in the individual and
small group markets, inside and
outside the exchanges by spreading
financial risk across the markets
Protects against premium increases in
the individual market by offsetting the
expenses of high-cost individuals
Stabilizes premiums and protects
against inaccurate premium setting
during initial years of the reform
Who
participates
Non-grandfathered individual and
small group market plans, both inside
and outside of the exchanges
All health insurance issuers and self-
insured plans contribute funds;
individual market plans subject to new
market rules (both inside and outside
the exchange) are eligible for payment
Qualified Health Plans (QHPs), which
are plans qualified to be offered on a
health insurance marketplace (also
called exchange)
How
it works
Plans’ average actuarial risk will be
determined based on enrollees’
individual risk scores. Plans with lower
actuarial risk will make payments to
higher risk plans. Payments net to zero
If an enrollee’s costs exceed a certain
threshold (called an attachment point),
the plan is eligible for payment (up to
the reinsurance cap). Payments net to
zero
HHS collects funds from plans with
lower than expected claims and makes
payments to plans with higher than
expected claims. Plans with actual
claims less than 97% of target
amounts pay into the programme and
plans with greater than 103% of target
amounts receive funds. Payments net
to zero
When
it goes into effect
2014, onward (Permanent) 2014–2016
(Temporary − 3 years)
2014–2016
(Temporary - 3 years)
Source: Redrawn from Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016.
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reinsurance and risk adjustment measures are all designed to help the market
function and conform to policy expectations. As Zuiderent-Jerak and Egmond
remarked of a risk adjustment system in the Dutch market, the aim is to
‘ensure that solidarity among the insured would not be at odds with competition
between insurers’ (2015, p. 48). Here too, risk adjustment is a device to reconcile
marketized health care and redistributive solidarity. The Individual Risk Score is
therefore in the equivocal position of being both an instance of data-driven per-
sonalization, as Lupton (2016a) suggests, and an element in how the ACA prac-
tices solidarity. In its aim to redistribute funds fromplans with lower-risk to those
with higher-risk enrollees, risk adjustment is a technique designed to stabilize
premiums and widen access to health cover. Individual Risk Scores – drawn
from age, sex and diagnoses – are de-identified and assigned to each enrollee to
determine the average risk score in each QHP. This allows plans with lower
actuarial risk to make payments to those with higher risk.
Once individual risk scores are calculated for all enrollees in the plan, these
values are averaged across the plan to arrive at the plan’s average risk score.
The average risk score, which is a weighted average of all enrollees’ individual
risk scores, represents the plan’s predicted expenses. Under the HHS method-
ology, adjustments are made for a variety of factors, including actuarial value (i.e.
the extent of patient cost-sharing in the plan), allowable rating variation, and geo-
graphic cost variation. Under risk adjustment, plans with a relatively low average
risk score make payments into the system, while plans with relatively high
average risk scores receive payments. (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016)
That these devices struggled to stabilize insurance markets and accomplish the
ACA’s redistributive goals is partly a function of how the law has fared in the
bitterUS policy environment. As I’ll argue next, the ACAmay have created incen-
tives for digital apps and wearables to nudge people towards health goals, but that
does not lead inevitably to their incorporation in insurance risk assessment.
Misfits? Oscar Health, wearables and the infrastructural challenges
of insurance pricing
InApril 2015,TheNewYorkTimes reported thatOscarHealth had joined the ranks
of ‘unicorn start-ups’, with a valuation above $1 billion, just 16 months after going
live (de la Merced, 2015). Oscar was then valued at $1.5 billion after raising $145
million to enable it to expand outsideNewYork andNew Jersey,where it had gath-
ered 40,000 customers by spring 2015. In February 2016, Forbes recorded a $2.7
billion valuation when Oscar had enrolled a modest 135,000 customers (Bertoni,
2016; Levy, 2017). The against-the-grain valuation is notable because Oscar lost
$120 million in 2015, then $200 million in 2016, and while the firm says it is
‘after one of the largest markets in the US, one that is worth 20% of GDP’, it is
a tiny player in US health insurance.16
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Start-ups are rare in health insurance, the market is dominated by giants like
United Health, Anthem, Cigna, Aetna and Humana, which are nevertheless
cautious enough about market conditions to be immersed in attempts at
further consolidation. Oscar was founded in 2013 to offer plans on the new
ACA markets. These markets are themselves a small portion of the overall
health insurance market which is dominated by the employers’ market covering
150 million people. In contrast, just 7 million people were covered through the
ACA markets in 2014 and 12.7 million in 2016. This might not make for head-
line grabbing valuations, but the company has generated disproportionate atten-
tion ever since its launch. One reason for this is that Oscar has been marked out
as a bellwether for the mix of disruptive innovation and ‘dataveillance’ that may
lay a path toward personalized insurance pricing.
Oscar has all the right hallmarks. It was founded by Joshua Kushner, Kevin
Nazeemi and Mario Schlosser, Harvard Business School and Stanford trained
entrepreneurs and data scientists. It aims to transform ‘user experience’ by
developing a more human and transparent interface with customers in a field
notorious for complex, impenetrable pricing and billing practices (Schleifer,
2016). It offers free primary-care ‘tele-visits’, downloadable electronic health
records, a navigable enrolment process with transparent costs and benefits
and incentivized preventative care – and all visibly integrated in ‘full stack’
Silicon Alley product branding. Among these features, one stands out.
In August 2014, the company announced it would begin offering members a free
Misfit fitness wearable plus Amazon gift-card rewards for those who met individua-
lized, algorithmically determined step-targets. This initiative drove much of the
firm’s initial press coverage which drew parallels with in-car telematics devices to
frame questions about the future prospects of price personalization.17 ‘What if’,
Steven Bertoni (2014) asked, ‘thanks to wearables, health insurance began to
work like car insurance where every health infraction (say a bar bender, Thanksgiv-
ing feast or sedentary Sunday of Netflix binge) hurt your health score and rocketed
your health premiums?’ Schlosser countered that discriminatory pricing is illegal
under the ACA and Oscar’s investment was calculated for risk reduction, not
assessment: ‘if we can really get people to walk more, it will almost for sure have
a huge impact on population health, and eventually health care costs, and that’s cer-
tainly worth investing in’ (Fischer, 2014), see Figure 2.
Figure 2 Oscar Health Misfit Scheme
Source: Oscar Health screenshots, 17 April 2016.
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Headlines continued throughout 2015 but the emphasis began to shift onto
the risks the company faced as it expanded to Southern California and Texas
for 2016 open enrolment.18 In 2016, the story was initially the disconnect
between the valuation and the losses recorded in regulatory filings. By the
summer a stream of articles investigated the ‘struggles’ and ‘headaches’ Oscar
was encountering even before it withdrew from markets in Dallas and New
Jersey in August.19 In stark contrast to the concern that wearable linked insur-
ance would provoke an era of behaviour-based pricing, Oscar lost money,
largely because its members were sicker than they expected. Enrolling sicker
customers than were in the pre-ACA individual markets, according to a Blue
Cross Blue Shield survey, was a feature across the ACA markets.20 Like most
others, Oscar had priced aggressively low:
In an effort to attract customers, insurers put prices on their plans that have
turned out to be too low to make a profit. The companies also assumed they
could offer the same sort of plans as they do through employer-based coverage,
including broad networks of doctors and hospitals. But the market has turned out
to be smaller than they hoped, with 12 million signed up for coverage in 2016.
Fewer employers have dropped health insurance than expected, for example,
keeping many healthy adults out of the individual market. And among the
remaining population, the insurers cannot pick and choose their customers.
The law forces them to insure people with pre-existing conditions, no matter
how expensive those conditions may be. (Abelson, 2016)
Oscar’s response to these challenges suggests that wearable data is not seen as a
short route to price personalization. As Schlosser maintains, the regulations sur-
rounding pre-existing conditions in the ACA prevent price personalization.
There are other insurance markets with fewer regulatory barriers and Oscar
has made it clear that the ACA markets are an entry point not an end goal for
the firm. So, in theory, the Misfit scheme could function as a data learning exer-
cise for the firm, enabling it to model relationships between wearable data and
health care costs and use this to inform risk assessment in other markets.
This seems plausible but there are significant problems with it. Health risk
assessment is much more complicated than driving risk assessment. In-car tele-
matics provide constant and comprehensive data-sets that demonstrate strong
correlations between accidents and a limited set of variables in individual
driving behaviour, for example, number of hours driven, time of journey,
speed, late braking, etc. Wearables and apps provide partial data that approxi-
mate movement, and often heart rate, from accelerometers and other sensors.
The data are partial, because users don’t always carry their devices, falsifiable
because trackers don’t know who or what is carrying the device, and of
limited risk assessment value because there is no clinically established relation-
ship between movement data and health. There is data, much of it gathered by
Discovery Ltd., the parent company of the market leading Vitality franchise,
including a Harvard Business School Case (Porter et al., 2014), that supports
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a relationship between activity tracking and health outcomes but this, like risk
more generally, is meaningful at the level of populations but not really at that
of individuals.
This being the case, why are health insurers interested in behavioural track-
ing and incentive schemes? One likely reason is that these schemes work as an
extended and targeted form of promotion. This is borne out by the distinctive-
ness of Oscar’s brand. Writing in Wired, Steven Levy (2017) noted that every-
thing from Oscar’s url (‘hioscar.com’) to its Apple-esque packaging ‘sends out a
millennial dog whistle: Come to me, my mobile-first darlings’. The free Misfit
tracker and the Amazon gift-cards target younger, hipper buyers – a group
with a not-coincidentally lower probability of ill-health. Personalization, as
Moor and Lury (2018) argue, is never just personal, it involves generalization
and the production of ‘types of Persons’. The tracker and gift-cards are co-
varying elements of the marketing mix, ‘since it is hard to separate the sense
in which the benefits they offer are a form of promotion from the sense in
which they are a form of pricing’ (2018, p.507).
Oscar’s claim to have ‘run the numbers’ suggesting returns in the form of
lower health costs from the Misfit scheme rings hollow. A more likely calcu-
lation was that the device would do no harm and might do some small good
to members’ health. The real benefits for Oscar would accrue if the scheme
attracted younger, fitter customers who are, as Neff and Nafus (2016) note,
the main users of wearables. This does not mean the scheme has no connection
with pricing. Wearable programmes have risk selection-like characteristics
(Arentz & Rehm, 2016) and this does impact on pricing but not by personalizing
it. Making profits in health insurance means pricing to cover the projected costs
of healthcare services consumed, at a level that attracts sufficient numbers of the
right sort of customers and is compliant with policy regulation. That is a much
tougher order than combining wearables and slick branding. To create commer-
cial value in insurance requires what Van Hoyweghen calls an ‘intermingling of
economic, managerial, accountancy, actuarial and medical knowledges, figures
and tools’ (2014, p. 347). Oscar’s inflated valuation is what enables it to
sustain its losses and although the level is unusual, insurance company
margins are always partly a matter of how they are capitalized. Profit is
derived at least as much from understanding the ‘time value of money’ as accu-
rate risk pricing (Ericson et al., 2000; McFall, 2014).
Oscar’s response to its 2016 losses also points to how marginal self-tracking
data is to cost control. It began by raising premiums by an average of 18.6 per
cent21, reflecting the industry experience that ACA markets were under-priced.
At the same time, it modified the product itself. The received wisdom in employer
markets is that patient choice is sovereign and insurers in the ACA’s individual
markets had largely followed the same principle. In 2016 it became clear that
the companies which fared best were those with strong cost control, lower cost
providers and limited networks. Oscar’s 2017 strategy cut back drastically on
the number of care providers it contracts with to gain more control over
pricing and patient experience. Their new, narrow network approach includes
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contracts with a limited, but prestigious, set of providers. They opened a clinic
with Mount Sinai Health System featuring a yoga studio, wellness centre and
receptionists/greeters trained to foment collaborative spirit by standing alongside
people as they log their arrivals on iPads. Like the Apple stores it references, the
clinic is the most visible face of Oscar’s ‘integrated system with a seamless flow of
data and collaboration from the concierge teams to general practitioner to special-
ists to hospitals’ (Levy, 2017).
This data must also flow back through billing, claims and enrolment pro-
cesses to allow Oscar to work on the complex algebra that links the population
appealed to, the population insured, the health costs incurred, claimed and
reimbursed, the prices charged, the federal subsidies issued, then all the way
back again. Big data integration, analyses and exchange, including the analysis
of patient data, are at the centre of Oscar’s strategy but there is very little to
suggest that wearable data is part of this mix. In a final mark of their limited
role at Oscar, while the firm continues to offer fitness incentives, it no longer
offers the Misfit and has, since 2016, steadily dropped its public association
with ‘wearables and social media’, see Figure 3.
This move took place in an environment of uncertainty which reached its
peak when Trump was elected in November 2016. A week after the election
Oscar posted ‘Our post-election thoughts on healthcare’.22 The post was
designed to ease concerns that the Republican commitment to repeal the
ACA would damage the company. In it, the company founders acknowledged
that ‘the ACA catalyzed a market that is responsive to this sort of disruption’
but insisted that their plans had always been ‘to sell quality health insurance
across any product line’. This may be so, but the election result likely hastened
Figure 3 Oscar Health Twitter exchange, December 2016
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the company’s pivot towards the group market. As things have turned out the
Trump administration’s disavowal of expertise has made repeal tougher to enact
than it is to chant about. Oscar doubled its presence in ACA markets offering
plans in nine states for 2019 open enrolment and this, not group insurance,
remains the core of their business. An interesting position for a company
which is delicately snared in this policy context. Joshua Kushner is the
brother of Jared, senior adviser and son-in-law to President Trump.
Concluding comments
ACA markets highlight the stubbornness of the infrastructures of solidarity in
healthcare payment. Self-tracking wearables have been cast as disruptive objects
implicated in a divisive and discriminatory personalization of healthcare. They
seem emblematic of broader trends in the digitalization of healthcare that for
some, for example in quantified self and patient led care communities,
present opportunities for empowerment and democratization (Neff & Nafus,
2016; Ruckenstein & Pantzar, 2015). For others, self-tracking practices are a
characteristic of an emergent form of biopolitical governance, part of both a neo-
liberal redistribution of responsibility from the state to the individual and the
extraction of monetary value from human life (Lupton, 2016a, 2016b). This
argument, plausible on the surface, is much less so when self-tracking devices
and practices are located within the conceptual, regulatory and infrastructural
frameworks underpinning US health insurance.
Conceptually, insurance organizes solidarity across groups by balancing risk
distribution and assessment. Personalizing solidarity to make risk an assessed
and priced property of individuals would tip the balance so far towards assess-
ment that it is not clear that any eventual product would qualify as insurance.
Baseline definitions of insurance vary but almost all include the spread, distri-
bution or transfer of risk, as a priceable entity, between insureds and insurers. A
contract that uses self-tracking data to price an individual’s access to healthcare
employs neither risk nor distribution as defined in insurance practices. Wear-
able surveillance that has financial and access consequences is a provocative
future scenario but not an especially likely one for insurers to pursue seriously.
In regulatory terms, the existing ACA framework supports the adoption of
data-driven behavioural technologies, it does not incentivise their incorporation
in pricing or access decisions. Protections for pre-existing conditions, and the
actuarial devices for reinsurance, risk assessment and risk corridors, purpose-
fully prevent the use of any individual level data derived for pricing. Even as
the Trump administration works on stealthily rolling back the hugely popular
pre-existing condition protections,23 it remains unlikely that self-tracking data
could be used to assess or price risk at an individual level for operational reasons.
Self-tracking data is used, alongside other health and wellbeing indicators like
gym membership and health assessments, to promote insurance. Oscar Health is
one example, but on a much larger international scale, the South African group
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Discovery Ltd. has been offering behaviour-based insurance products since the
early 1990s. In the last decade Discovery have become the market leaders
through the Vitality brand offered by a network of partners and franchisees. In
their 2017 Annual Report, Discovery assert that data about customer engagement
with its behavioural programmes in driving, health and life insurance, feeds into
‘dynamic risk pricing’. Dynamic risk pricing and price optimization are the indus-
try terms that most closely resemble the concept of personalized pricing but there
are instructive differences between them. Price optimization involves using ‘non-
actuarial’ factors, including customer sentiment and propensity to buy. It is a
strategy derived from the importance of online searches and comparison websites
in insurance purchasing that produce harvestable data for customer analysis and
modelling. This allows insurers to offer customers differential, dynamic prices
according to their online characteristics and behaviour (Minty, 2016). This is a
data-driven innovation in insurance pricing that is in widespread use but has
had far less attention in critical scholarship than self-tracking data. It has not,
however, escaped regulatory attention (Minty, 2017).
Underneath the conceptual, regulatory and infrastructural characteristics of
insurance are challenges and opportunities that are not getting the attention they
deserve. There are real obstacles to transforming self-tracking data into personalized
risk categories but that does not mean there is nothing to see. Datafication pro-
cesses, using data from hospital visits to web searches, are underway in insurance.
These processes are black-boxed, lack transparency and sufficient regulatory over-
sight (Pasquale, 2013; 2015; Powles & Hodson, 2017). Yet, there is, as Kitchin
(2016) points out, nothing inevitable about the current state of data regulation.
Silicon Valley attitudes to the repurposing of data are at odds with the regulatory
environment as expressed most recently in the European General Data Protection
Regulation of 2018. GDPR regulation echoes earlier versions of ‘fair information
principles’ particularly that of data minimization which states that data can only
be used for the purposes for which it was collected. Closer attention to how this
is interpreted in insurance practice would be a good target for critical data scholar-
ship. Moving from group risk pricing to personalize risk pricing is a fundamental
and problematic change for all parties to the insurance contract. It is far from inevi-
table in a slow-moving, reputation and price sensitive industry. Health insurance
works in market spaces that are created by regulation that also protects character-
istics - race, gender, genomic data and pre-existing conditions - from discrimi-
nation. As new possibilities for discrimination based on lifestyle tracking arise, so
do new possibilities for regulation. Solidarity is an organized practice, it can be reor-
ganized, maybe even personalized, but it has always to be regulated.
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2 See https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/creepy-anti-obamacar
e-ads-suggest-where-uncle-sam-wants-to-stick-it/279825/ - the commercial itself can
be seen here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7KHjg6mtewI
3 48.6 million were uninsured in 2010 falling to 29.3 million in 2016 https://aspe.hhs.gov/
basic-report/overview-uninsured-united-states-summary-2011-current-population-survey
https://www.kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/
4 As of September 2017, the Trump administration’s numerous efforts to ‘repeal
and replace’ the ACA continue. http://www.healthreformtracker.org/ahca-timeline/;
http://khn.org/news/obamacares-history-littered-with-near-death-experiences/
http://www.kff.org/interactive/proposals-to-replace-the-affordable-care-act/
5 There was also the contentious reform and expansion of Medicaid (Hertel-Fernan-
dez et al., 2016).
6 See https://khn.org/news/marketplace-confusion-opens-door-to-questions-about-
skinny-plans https://www.kff.org/report-section/understanding-short-term-limited-
duration-health-insurance-issue-brief/
7 http://kff.org/report-section/the-uninsured-a-primer-what-was-happening-to-ins
urance-coverage-leading-up-to-the-aca/
8 https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/qualified-health-plan/ https://www.healthc
are.gov/coverage/what-marketplace-plans-cover/
9 One example was the ‘Jimmy Kimmel’ test. Senator Cassidy, of the Graham-Cassidy
repeal bill of 2017, said that he would only sponsor legislation that would pass what he
called the Jimmy Kimmel test. Kimmel is a US comedian whose son was born with a con-
genital heart defect requiring treatment that would have exceeded lifetime limits on costs in
the first few months of his life. When the Graham-Cassidy bill came out, Kimmel agreed
that the bill would pass a Kimmel test but a different one, one which meant that a child
would get the care s/he needed – but only if its father was Jimmy Kimmel.
10 See https://www.healthcare.gov/preventive-care-adults/ https://www.healthcare
.gov/coverage/what-marketplace-plans-cover/ http://obamacarefacts.com/obamacare-
smokers/ https://www.healthcare.gov/coverage/pre-existing-conditions/
Liz McFall: Personalizing solidarity? 21
11 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 1996 https://www.hhs.gov/
hipaa/for-individuals/guidance-materials-for-consumers/index.html .
12 Original tweet accessible at https://twitter.com/katecrawford/status/104255839
6497649664
13 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/business/how-broccoli-became-a-symbol
-in-the-health-care-debate.html?pagewanted=all
14 http://khn.org/news/faq-on-individual-insurance-mandate-aca/ http://www.fool
.com/investing/2016/08/14/4-reasons-your-obamacare-healthcare-premium-is-pro.aspx
15 Motley Fool reports only 12.6 per cent was paid out by federal government of the
$2.87 billion requested to cover insurers’ losses on the marketplaces http://www.fool.
com/investing/2016/08/14/4-reasons-your-obamacare-healthcare-premium-is-pro.aspx.
16 See https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/oscar#/entity
17 Google search results produced 237 stories about Oscar Health between April 2014-
2016. See for example https://www.wired.com/2014/12/oscar-misfit/ https://gigaom.
com/2014/12/08/insurance-provider-oscar-will-reward-you-if-you-hit-your-step-goal
/ http://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/blog/techflash/2014/12/oscar-passing-out-
fitness-trackers-incentives-to.html http://fortune.com/2014/12/09/oscar-health-insur
ance/ http://gizmodo.com/an-insurance-company-will-pay-you-to-use-your-fitness-t
-1668967153
18 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-03/for-health-insurance-sta
rtup-oscar-cute-ads-only-go-so-far; Lee (2015).
19 https://www.fastcompany.com/3055700/warning-trying-to-disrupt-health-insur
ance-may-cause-headaches http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/08/josh-kushner-o
scar-health-obamacare https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-23/insura
nce-startup-oscar-quits-markets-rethinks-obamacare-plans
20 https://www.bcbs.com/the-health-of-america/reports/the-evolving-affordable-ca
re-act-marketplaces-the-2015-2016.
21 http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20160518/HEALTH_CARE/16051984
7/health-insurers-are-requesting-double-digit-bumps-for-obamacare-premiums-across
-the-state-with-unitedhealth-seeking-a-45-6-hike
22 https://www.hioscar.com/news/our-post-election-thoughts-on-healthcare
23 https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/ask-kff-karen-pollitz-answers-3-
questions-on-trump-administrations-new-aca-waiver-guidelines/
ORCID
Liz McFall http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8681-2576
References
Abelson, R. (2016, June 19). Health
insurer hoped to disrupt the industry,
but struggles in state marketplaces. The
New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/20/
business/struggling-for-profit-selling-
healthinsurance-in-state-marketplaces.
html.
Abraham, K. S. (1985). Efficiency
and fairness in insurance risk
22 Economy and Society
classification. Virginia Law Review, 71,
403–451.
Arentz, C. & Rehm, R. (2016). Behavior-
based tariffs in health insurance.Otto Wolff
Discussion Paper, 04/2016.
Arrow, K. J. (1963). Uncertainty and the
welfare economics of medical care. The
American Economic Review, 53(5),
941–973.
Baker, T. (2010). Health insurance, risk,
and responsibility after the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.
University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
159, 1577–1621.
Baldwin, P. ((1990)). The politics of social
solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bayertz, K. (Ed.). (1999). Solidarity.
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Bertoni, S. (2014, December 8). Oscar
Health using Misfit wearables to reward fit
customers. Fortune. Retrieved from
https://www.forbes.com/sites/
stevenbertoni/2014/12/08/oscarhealth-
using-misfit-wearables-to-reward-fit-
customers/#5b3febd993c5.
Bertoni, S. (2016, 22 February). Oscar
Health gets $400 million and a $2.7 billion
valuation from Fidelity. Forbes. Retrieved
from http://www.forbes.com/sites/
stevenbertoni/2016/02/22/oscar-health-
gets-400-millionand-a-2-7-billion-
valuation-from-fidelity/#3161926b44bd.
Bowker, G. & Star, S. L. (1999). Sorting
things out: Classification and its conse-
quences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
boyd, D. & Crawford, K. (2012). Critical
questions for big data. Information,
Communication & Society, 15(5), 662–679.
Burchell, G., Gordon, C. & Miller, P.
(Eds.). (1991). The Foucault effect: Studies
in governmentality. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press.
Commonwealth Fund. (2015). US
health care from a global perspective.
Retrieved from http://www.commo
nwealthfund.org/publicatio
ns/issue-briefs/2015/oct/us-health-care
from-a-global-perspective).
Crawford, K., Lingel, J. & Karppi, T.
(2015). Our metrics, ourselves. European
Journal of Cultural Studies, 18(4-5), 479–496.
de la Merced, M. (2015, April 20). Oscar, a
health insurance start-up, valued at $1.5
billion. The New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/21/
business/dealbook/oscar-a-health-insuranc
estart-up-valued-at-1-5-billion.html?_r = 0.
Discovery Ltd. (2017). Integrated Annual
Report: 25 years of making people healthier.
Retrieved from https://www.discovery.
co.za/marketing/integrated-annualrepor
t/?page = 1 [accessed December 3].
Dobbin, F. (1992). The origins of private
social insurance: Public policy and fringe
benefits in America, 1920-1950. American
Journal of Sociology, 97(5), 1416–1450.
Donzelot, J. (1988). The promotion of
the social. Economy and Society, 17(3),
395–427.
Donzelot, J. (1991). The mobilization of
society. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P.
Miller (Eds.), The Foucault effect: Studies
in governmentality (pp. 169–180). Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press.
Ericson, R., Barry, D. & Doyle, A.
(2000). The moral hazards of neo-liberal-
ism: Lessons from the private insurance
industry. Economy and Society, 29(4),
532–558.
Ewald, F. (1991). Insurance and risk. In
G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller (Eds.),
The Foucault effect: Studies in governmen-
tality (pp. 196–210). Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Fischer, B. (2014, December 8). Oscar
passing out fitness trackers, incentives to
members. New York Business Journal.
Retrieved from https://www.bizjournals.
com/newyork/blog/techflash/2014/12/
oscar-passing-out-fitness-trackers-
incentives-to.html [Accessed 20 January
2019].
Gerson, E. M. & Star, S. L. (1991).
Analyzing due process in the workplace.
ACM Transactions on Office Information
Systems, 4(3), 257–270.
Gorrell, P. (2016). Medicare payment
models: Past, present, and future.
Retrieved from 77000-2016 support.sas.-
com/resources/papers/proceedings16/
7700-2016.pdf.
Hacking, I. (1990). The taming of chance.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Liz McFall: Personalizing solidarity? 23
Hertel-Fernandez, A., Skocpol, T. &
Lynch, D. (2016). Business associations,
conservative networks, and the ongoing
Republican war over Medicaid expansion.
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law,
41(2), 239–286.
Jacobs, L. & Skocpol, T. (2010).
Healthcare reform and American politics:
What everyone needs to know. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2016).
Explaining health care reform: Risk
adjustment, reinsurance and risk corridors.
Retrieved from http://kff.org/
healthreform/issuebrief/explaining-
health-care-reform-risk-adjustment-
reinsurance-and risk-corridors/.
Kitchin, R. (2016). Getting smarter about
smart cities: Improving data privacy and
data security. Dublin: Data Protection
Unit, Department of the Taoiseach.
Knight, F. (1921). Risk, uncertainty and
profit. Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press.
Leaver, A. (2015). Fuzzy knowledge: An
historical exploration of moral hazard and
its variability. Economy and Society, 44(1),
91–109.
Lee, A. (2015, October 7). What Oscar is
up against. The Information. Retrieved
from https://www.theinformation.com
[Accessed 141218].
Lehtonen, T.-K. & Liukko, J. (2012).
The forms and limits of insurance soli-
darity. Journal of Business Ethics, 103(S1),
33–44.
Levy, S. (2017, January 6). Oscar is dis-
rupting health care in a hurricane. Wired.
Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/
2017/01/oscar-is-disrupting-health-care-
in-ahurricane/#.cvlw42har.
Lupton, D. (2016a). The quantified self: A
sociology of self-tracking. Cambridge:
Polity.
Lupton, D. (2016b). The diverse domains
of quantified selves: Self-tracking modes
and dataveillance. Economy and Society, 45
(1), 101–122.
Mayer-Schönberger, V. & Cukier, K.
(2013). Big data: A revolution that will
transform how we live, work, and think.
Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
McFall, L. (2011). A ‘good, average
man’: Calculation and the limits of
statistics in enrolling insurance
customers. The Sociological Review, 59(4),
661–684.
McFall, L. ((2014)). Devising consumption:
Cultural economies of insurance, credit and
spending. London: Routledge.
McFall, L. & Moor, L. (2018). Who, or
what, is insurtech personalizing? Persons,
prices and the historical classifications of
risk. Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory,
19(2), 193–213.
McGoey, L. (2012). Strategic unknowns:
Towards a sociology of ignorance.
Economy and Society, 41(1), 1–16.
Meyers, G. (2018). Behaviour-based per-
sonalisation in health insurance: A sociology
of a not-yet market. KU Leuven:
Proefschrift aangeboden tot het verkrijgen
van de graad van Doctor in de Sociale
Wetenschappen, CESO.
Meyers, G. & Van Hoyweghen, I.
(2018)). Enacting actuarial fairness in
insurance: From fair discrimination to be-
haviour-based fairness. Science as Culture,
27(4), 413–438.
Minty, D. (2016). Price optimisation for
insurance optimising price; destroying value?
Thinkpiece Chartered Insurance Institute.
Retrieved from https://www.cii.co.uk/
learning/learning-content-hub [Accessed
20 January 2019].
Minty, D. (2017). The ethics of insurance
pricing: 7 risks underwriters need to have
on their radar. Retrieved from https://
ethicsandinsurance.info/2017/10/18/
insurancepricing/ [Accessed 3 December
2018].
Moats, D. &McFall, L. (2018). In search
of a problem. Science, Technology &
Human Values, 6(3). Retrieved from
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0162243918
796274.
Moor, L. & Lury, C. (2018). Price and
the person: Markets, discrimination, and
personhood. Journal of Cultural Economy,
11(6), 501–513.
Mulligan, J. (2015). Insurance accounts:
The cultural logics of health care finan-
cing. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 30
(1), 37–61.
Murray, J. (2007). Origins of American
health insurance. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
24 Economy and Society
Nafus, D. (Ed.). (2016). Quantified:
Biosensing technologies in everyday life.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Neff, G. & Nafus, D. (2016). Self-track-
ing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Olson, P. (2014, June 19). Wearable tech
is plugging into health insurance. Forbes.
Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/
sites/parmyolson/2014/06/19/wearable-
tech-health-insurance/#16d50cff5ba1.
O’Malley, P. (1996). Risk and responsi-
bility. In A. Barry, T. Osborne & N. Rose
(Eds.), Foucault and political reason (pp.
189–208). Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
O’Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of math
destruction. New York, NY: Crown.
Pasquale, F. (2013). Grand bargains for
big data: The emerging law of health
information.Maryland Law Review, 72(3),
682–771.
Pasquale, F. (2015). The black box society:
The secret algorithms that control money and
information. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Poon, M. (2016). Corporate capitalism
and the growing power of big data: Review
essay. Science, Technology & Human
Values, 41(6), 1088–1108.
Poovey, M. (2002). The liberal civil
subject and the social in eighteenth-
century British moral philosophy. Public
Culture, 14(1), 125–145.
Porter, M., Kramer, M. & Sesia, A.
(2014). Discovery limited. Harvard
Business School Case 715-423, December
(Revised August 2018.).
Porter, T. (1996). Trust in numbers: The
pursuit of objectivity in public life. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Powles, J. & Hodson, H. (2017). Google
DeepMind and healthcare in an age of
algorithms. Health and Technology, 7(4),
351–367.
Prainsack, B. & Buyx, A. (2017).
Solidarity in biomedicine and beyond.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ruckenstein, M. & Pantzar, M. (2015).
Beyond the quantified self: Thematic
exploration of a dataistic paradigm. New
Media & Society, 19(3), 401–418.
Schleifer, D. (2016). Face-to-face price
transparency. AJMC.com. Retreived from
http://www.ajmc.com/contributor/
david-schleifer-phd/2015/07/face-to-
face-pricetransparency.
Schüll, N. D. (2016). Data for life:
Wearable technology and the design of
self-care. BioSocieties, 11(3), 317–333.
Skocpol, T. (2010). The political chal-
lenges that may undermine health reform.
Health Affairs, 29(7), 1288–1292.
Swedloff, R. (2015). Risk classification’s
big data (r)evolution. Connecticut Insurance
Law Journal, 21(1), 339–374.
The Economist. (2015, March 12). Risk
and reward: Data and technology are
starting to up-end the insurance business.
Retrieved from http://www.economist.
com/news/finance-and-economics/
21646260-data-and-technology-are-
starting-up-end-insurance business-risk-
and-reward?fsrc = scn/ln_ec/risk_and_
reward.
United States Census Bureau. (2017).
Income, poverty, and health insurance cov-
erage in the United States: 2016. Retrieved
from https://www.census.gov/library/
publications/2017/demo/p60-260.html.
Van Hoyweghen, I. ((2014)). On the
politics of calculative devices. Journal of
Cultural Economy, 7(3), 334–352.
Zuiderent-Jerak, T. & van Egmond, S.
(2015). Ineffable cultures or material
devices: What valuation studies can learn
from the disappearance of ensured soli-
darity in a health care market. Valuation
Studies, 3(1), 45–73.
Liz McFall is Director of GovTech and Chancellor’s Fellow based in the Edinburgh
Futures Institute and Sociology at the University of Edinburgh. She co-edited
Markets and the arts of attachment with Franck Cochoy and Joe Deville (Routledge,
2017), is author of Devising consumption: Cultural economies of insurance, credit and spend-
ing (Routledge, 2014) and Advertising: A cultural economy (Sage, 2004). She is Co-Editor-
in-Chief of the Journal of Cultural Economy.
Liz McFall: Personalizing solidarity? 25
